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Feryal Tansug
Memory and Migration:
The Turkish Experience of the Compulsory 
Population Exchange
Following the First World War, minority groups, particularly Greeks, Armenians, and, to an extent, Jews and Kurds, had to leave Turkey, 
while Muslim Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Cretans had to migrate 
to Turkey, turning from migrants to refugees as part of the immense dis­
location of the Great War and the Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922. The 
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
was signed between Turkey and Greece on the 30th of January 1923, and 
was later integrated to the Lausanne Peace Treaty (24 July 1923). This con­
vention constitutes a unique example of an internationally approved com­
pulsory population exchange agreement of the modern age. Although it is 
difficult to know the exact number of people who fled to Greece and Turkey 
due to the exchange, the estimated number of Greeks who entered Greece 
between 1919 and 1923 is approximately more than 1,200,000 persons,1 and 
the number of Turks who left Greece is approximately 350,000.2
Unlike the situation in Greece, in Turkey the compulsory population 
exchange is not popularly known. However, the recent academic3 and
1. Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon 
Greece, Paris: Mouton & Co, 1962, p. 69, 99. Kemal An, Büyük Miibadele. Tiirkiye’ye 
Zorunlu Gôç (1923-1925), Istanbul, Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2nd. ed, 2000, p. 177. 
It is important to note that these people did not leave for Greece after the population 
exchange agreement. The flight of people occurred in two phases: the first one 
during the withdrawal of the Greek army in 1922, and the second one between 1923 
and 1924, after the Convention was signed.
2. Pentzopoulos, op.cit., p. 69; An, op.cit., p. 177; Renée Hirschon, Miibadele 
Çocuklan, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2000, p. 9.
3. Renée Hirschon (ed.), Crossing the Aegean: an Appraisal of the 1923 Compul-
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mass media4 developments in Turkey allow us to hope that nationalist 
biases in society will be abated. Since the 1990s novels have also been 
published about the compulsory population exchange. Regrettably, the 
Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants could not be established until 
2001, 79 years after the exchange agreement.5
There are positive and negative assessments of the compulsory popu­
lation exchange. While political and diplomatic perspectives regard it 
as a necessary solution to end the conflict between Greece and Turkey 
resulting from the clash of two nationalisms in the early 1920s, perspec­
tives from the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, economics and 
international law have a more critical approach.6 The history of these 
events has been employed in the nation building processes of the two 
countries,7 influencing negatively people’s perceptions of multicultural 
co-existence and generating ‘otherness’.
sory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2003.
4. Apart from journalistic articles and articles flourishing in the printed media, 
there are also documentary films shown in film festivals and in local art and 
culture festivals. Some examples of documentaries concerning the compulsory 
population exchange are the following: Gôkçeada: Land of Those Who Left, Came 
and Stayed, Ne§e Ertiirk, 48 min., in Turkish with English subtitles; Kalimerhaba 
Side, Sava§ Giivezne, 55 min., in Turkish; Passing Drama, Angela Melitopoulos, 
66 min., in German and Greek with English subtitles; Locket, Foreign Witness of 
Greek Republic, Mehmet Polat, 27 min., in Turkish; The Story of Both Sides of the 
Water, Büçra Kose, 23 min., in Turkish; Thinking of the Aegean, Enis Riza, 160 min., 
in Turkish; Sorrow: Homeland of Separateness: Kayaköy, 26 min., in Turkish and 
Greek with English subtitles.
5. The Association aims to publicize the real picture of the Turkish refugees and 
exchange agreement by organizing conferences and meetings, by conducting oral 
history interviews with those who are still alive, and by encouraging academics 
to make researches on this issue. The association aims to contribute to cultivate 
peace between the two countries. Moreover, journalistic interviews with first 
generation muhacirs are flourishing in the printed press lately, iskender Özsoy, a 
journalist, published his interviews with first generation muhacirs in a two-volume 
book (Iskender Özsoy, Iki Vatan Yorgunlan, vol. I-II, Istanbul: Badlan, 2003). Kemal 
Yalçin published the interviews he took during his trip from Turkey to Greece 
(Kemal Yalçm, Emanet Çeyiz. Mübadele Insani an, Istanbul: Belge, 1998).
6. Hirschon, op. cit.
7. Ibid., p. 11.
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In this research, based on a small number of oral history interviews, 
I was interested, initially, in the way in which Turkish refugees perceive 
the Compulsory Population Exchange Agreement. In dealing with this 
question, I came across multiple representations of the Turkish Repub­
lic, which grew out of the experience. As will be seen below, the inter­
viewees related my question directly to the Turkish State.
This study is based on the oral history methods of data gathering 
which I undertook in Istanbul and Izmir in the summer of 2003.8 It fo­
cuses on oral history interviews of four Turks from Ioannina,9 one from 
Kavala, one from Salonica10 and one from Crete.11 To identify the inter­
viewees, I use the term muhacir, refugee. My interviewees also identi­
fied themselves as muhacirs, not as migrants, a concept that did not exist 
then as clearly as it does now.
In this article, I am at first interested in the Turkish refugees’ popular 
sentiments about the compulsory population exchange. The major prob­
lem of Turkish national history is its ignorance of popular sentiments or 
experiences.12 This article attempts, to an extent, to overcome this short­
8. This oral history project, with the title ‘The settlement and perception of 
the Turks of Greece after the Lausanne Populations Exchange Agreement of 1923’, 
was approved by the Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, the Ethics 
Review Unit of the University of Toronto on the 16th of April 2003 (protocol reference 
no 9461). The preliminary results of this oral history study were presented in the 
Association of Nationalities Conference, «Nation, Identity and Conflict», Columbia 
University, New York, 17-19 April 2004.
9. Ioannina, the former Ottoman territory in the Balkans, in the northwestern 
Greece, fell under the Greek rule during the Balkan wars in March 1913.
10. Salonica was surrendered to Greece on the 26th of October 1912, during the 
First Balkan War (8 October 1912 - 30 May 1913), by a protocol between the Ottoman 
and Greek States.
11. Crete was given autonomy as a result of the 1897 Ottoman-Greek War (18 
December 1897). It was officially incorporated into Greece as a result of the First 
Balkan War, by the Treaty of London, on the 30th of May 1913. Cretan Muslims 
were included in the Compulsory Population Exchange Agreement between Greece 
and Turkey, and, as a result, almost 30,000 Muslim Turks left Crete in 1923. Niikhet 
Adiyeke, Osmanli Imparatorlugu ve Girit Bunalimi (1896-1908), Ankara: TTK, 
2000, p. 198, 304.
12. Çaglar Keyder, 'The consequences of the Exchange of Populations for 
Turkey’, in Hirschon, op. cit., p. 39-52. Until the early 1990s, newspaper articles 
and documentaries mostly published about the Greeks from Asia Minor who had
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coming. The use of oral narratives as a historical source might support 
official histories or might challenge them, depending on how historians 
reconstruct history from these narratives. Regrettably, we must not for­
get that the memoirs of the first generation, the parents of these inter­
viewees, are absent from Turkish historiography and will remain so. 
They have all passed away. Today only their children survive, who came 
to Turkey during their childhood, and the children of the refugees who 
were born in Turkey in the early days of the Republic, and shared their 
families’ economic sufferings in the places they resettled. The analysis 
of the memoirs of the actual first generation refugees might have been a 
very fruitful area to study if this chance had not been lost. My aim is not 
to analyze the memoirs of Turkish migrants who came to Turkey during 
their childhood, a field in which Social-Psychological Studies are spe­
cialized. I am aware of the historical/sociological divide on the role and 
use of memory as a source in historical research. Therefore, I am using 
Paul Connerton’s differentiation between social memory and historical 
reconstruction. Professional historians utilize the historical construction 
method when they seek to identify traces of past events. Connerton indi­
cates that historical reconstruction is independent from social memory, 
in the sense that what has been forgotten may be rediscovered by his­
tory. However, he also suggests that any historical construction may 
be strengthened by the social memory of groups, as in the case of oral 
history.13 This paper attempts to understand the ideological and political 
impacts on social memory, and to reconstruct the history of the popula­
tion exchange by taking into consideration the ideological and political 
criteria. Therefore, as Ted Swedenburg notes, quoting from Taussig, ‘my
to leave Turkey before and after the exchange. Interestingly, common people in 
Turkey are more interested in the Greeks from Asia Minor than in their Muslim 
counterparts. According to Damla Demirözü, there might be two reasons for this: 
First, the tendency of the people to see Greek-Turkish co-existence with a pleasant 
nostalgia. This is something that people make up in the way they wanted to see 
it. The second reason might be the desire of the Turkish intellectuals to relate 
Turks to the Western world through Greeks from Asia Minor, who are seen as the 
representatives of the Western world, and with whom Turks shared a history. See 
Damla Demirözü’s article in this volume.
13. Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 13-14.
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concern therefore was not [so much] whether facts are real but what the 
politics of their interpretation and representation is’.14 I am concerned 
with how people who migrated to Turkey between 1922 and 1924, and 
who were born in Turkey by first generation migrants, remembered the 
significant turning point in their lives, and with the relationship of their 
memoirs to the standard Turkish historiography. I am also interested in 
investigating their experiences of the forced migration and how their 
memories were affected by the dominant nationalist historiography and 
social atmosphere in their ‘new homeland’.
The prevailing assumption regarding the settlement of refugees and 
impact of the population exchange is that the settlement of Turkish 
refugees was considered easier to solve because the number of abandoned 
properties of the Greeks from Asia Minor and other minorities was 
high enough to settle a relatively small number of incoming Turkish 
refugees.15 Recent studies based on archival data and interviews with 
muhacirs invalidated this prevailing assumption. They demonstrated 
that the impact of the exchange on Muslim newcomers to Anatolia was 
as detrimental as that on the Greeks from Asia Minor who were forced 
to move to Greece.16 They lost their livelihoods, suffered immensely 
during the resettlement process, and struggled to survive in Turkey. My 
interviewees also told me in detail how they and their parents suffered 
financially for a long period. Although the economic and social impact of 
the compulsory population exchange is beyond the scope of this paper,17
14. Quoted in Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: the 1936-1939 Rebellion and 
the Palestinian National Past, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, 
xxvi.
15. Stephen Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932; Pentzopoulos, op.cit.
16. Onur Yildirim, Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek 
Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934, New York and London: Routledge, 2006; Tolga 
Köker, ‘Lessons in refugeehood: The experience of forced migrants in Turkey’, 
in Hirschon, op. cit., p. 193-208. I agree with Tolga Köker who argues that the 
compulsory population exchange turned minorities into suffering refugees. My 
interviewees in their accounts also spoke in detail about their great suffering for 
years in Turkey.
17. For the economic and social impact of the exchange, see An, op. cit.; Ayhan 
Aktar, ‘Homogenising the nation, turkifying the economy: the Turkish experience
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suffice it to mention that they could not obtain the equivalent of the 
properties and land they had left behind, and they were unfamiliar 
with the climate, land, and agriculture of the new territories where 
they settled. Focusing on their representations of the Turkish Republic, 
this study may contribute towards a better understanding of their 
nationalism, which might help to overcome nationalist attachments in 
dealing with issues of “other” and minorities.
The nationalist elite of Turkey preferred to construct history and 
national identity in an instrumental fashion, which is generally biased 
towards the modernization project, and treats individuals as passive 
recipients of their message. In the early days of the Republic, the state 
promoted identity, ‘turkishness’, and silenced the muhacirs, as their real 
‘turkishness’ was already questioned by the natives as soon as they 
arrived. They were called, ‘half infidels’ (‘gavurs’), ’fake Muslims’, ‘fake 
Turks’, ‘infidel seeds’ or ‘Muslims of Ali Pasha of Iannina’.18 Hence, their 
experiences and memoirs of their earlier homelands were left unvoiced 
in the early Republican atmosphere. In my case study of these Turkish 
forced migrants, no matter how much they suffered economically and 
socially, no matter how much they were humiliated by the native Turks 
and lost the social status they had in Greece, they willingly came to 
merge into the nation that they ‘imagined’.19
When muhacirs were asked: ‘what did you know about Turkey when 
you used to live in Greece? Was it a place that someday you wished to 
move to?’ the answer to these questions was negative. They had never 
seen the former Ottoman lands in Asia Minor which eventually became
of population exchange reconsidered’, in Hirschon, op. cit., p. 79-95; Yildirim, op. 
cit.; Köker, op. cit.
18. KHT (second generation muhacir from Ioannina) explained the origin of this 
name as she learned it from her family: ‘It is said that Tepelenli Ali Pasha converted 
Greeks into Islam forcefully in Ioannina. Therefore, Muslim Turks in Ioannina were 
generally called “Muslims of Ali Pasha of Iannina”, meaning not “real” Muslim 
Turks’. KHT, Oral History Interview, 28 July 2003.
19. Benedict Anderson discusses why nations are ‘imagined’ and the motives to 
reach these ‘imagined’ nations. He asks: ‘what makes the shrunken imagining of 
recent history generate such colossal sacrifices? So many millions of people willingly 
die for these imaginings’. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections 
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London and New York: Verso, 1989, p. 16.
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Turkey; they had never heard about the names of the cities in Asia Mi­
nor apart from Istanbul and Izmir, and they never had native Turkish 
neighbors or friends. Muslim Turks from Ioannina and Crete did not 
speak one word of Turkish, but they perceived the Turkish nation with 
‘deep and horizontal comradeship’.20 However, this perception became 
apparent when the Turkish defense movement was initiated in Asia Mi­
nor against Greek troops. According to the muhacir interviewees, the 
Greeks had their state, but the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, and the 
Turks needed their state too. ‘If there is a Turkish state there, why 
should muhacirs have to stay with the Greek (Rum)21 anymore?’ most of 
them said. In this context, when they were asked about their relation­
ship with the Greeks, they did not remember any unpleasant events that 
they or their parents experienced before the occupation of Izmir by the 
Greek army. They remembered a peaceful social atmosphere, but distant 
social relationships between Greeks and Turks before the Turkish-Greek 
war of 1919-1922. The eldest interviewee RO (b. 1911, Ioannina) remem­
bers their relations with Greeks in Ioannina as follows:
We had a nice and happy life in Ioannina. Both Greeks and Turks used to 
live in peace there. We lived under the Greek rule for 11 years. We respected 
each other’s traditions, celebrations, bayrams, we would send them meat in 
the bayrams, and they would send us eggs in Easter. Greeks, Rum, never 
disturbed us until the war broke out. They respected our family very much 
there, especially my father. He was a much respected lawyer in Ioannina, 
he was a very religious, conservative and enlightened man. One night we 
woke up by the sound of the bells from the churches; except for my father, 
the rest of us were really scared; my father went outside, there were two 
outside gates in order to enter into the main house where we lived, he went 
to the very outside one to see what was happening; our [Greek] neighbor 
told him that ‘don’t worry Ibrahim Efendi, don’t worry, we took Izmir, now 
it is Bursa’s turn’; my father replied, ‘very soon, we [Turks] will take all of 
them back.’ That night bad language was heard about Mustafa Kemal, they 
sang songs for Izmir, I cannot ever forget. But what happened, we [Turks] 
took all of them back eventually.22
20. Ibid.
21. Muhacir interviewees called the Greeks of Ioannina, Crete, and Salonica Rum. 
They did not make differentiation between continental Greeks by calling them Yunanli 
(“the one from Greece”) and Greeks of the Ottoman Empire by calling them Rum.
22. RO, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 7 May 2003.
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LK (b. 1914, Ioannina) says:
We were under the Greek rule for 11 years, before the war, we had very 
good relations, everything was fine. My father was a bank manager in the 
Agricultural Bank. I had many Rum friends, our relations were very good. 
But, all of a sudden, everything changed as soon as they landed in Izmir 
and started to proceed. All of a sudden they became hostile to us, espe­
cially during their withdrawal from Izmir, we could not breathe there, they 
insulted us so badly. Greek soldiers returned from the front without legs, 
arms. It was normal. How could they show us sympathy as before under 
these conditions?23
The fathers of LK and RO (bank manager and lawyer) were members 
of the exchange commission to organize the transfer of populations in 
Ioannina. They regarded leaving Ioannina necessary. RO spoke about 
how her father convinced her mother to leave, when her mother was 
scared to leave her homeland and make a long journey by boat:
Are you crazy? I have four daughters, am I going to let them become pros­
titutes here? What an inappropriate situation! You’ll come; I’ll give you 
medicine to make you sleep in the ship so that you won’t feel anything dur­
ing the trip.24
ET (b. 1920, Parga),25 whose father was an affluent tradesman in 
Ioannina running his small-scaled oil factory and whose mother was a 
primary school teacher, talks about his parents’ good and close relations 
with Greeks. His parents were among those who did not want to leave 
Ioannina. When the exchange decision was confirmed and declared as 
compulsory, ET’s father went to the north of Ioannina, to the Albanian 
border to change their nationalities in order for them to stay in Greece.26 
But he could not achieve this. Greek officials came to their house while 
his father had left for the Albanian border and gave his mother a twenty- 
four-hour notice to leave Ioannina in his father’s absence, so ET and his
23. LK, Oral History Interview, 10 May 2003.
24. RO, Oral History Interview, 7 May 2003.
25. ET, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 16 July 2003.
26. The Greek state had allowed those who wanted to stay in Greece to do so on 
condition that they would change their nationalities to Albanian, French, British, 
whatever they wanted, except Greek. Noted by interviewee LK, 10 May 2003; for 
the religious and political criteria in the language of the Convention, see Ladas, op. 
cit., p. 378-383.
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mother had to leave the country within twenty four hours. In 1973, ET 
received a letter from one of his Greek friends from his childhood in 
Ioannina introducing himself and his family to him as being very close 
friends in Ioannina, and invited him for a holiday in his hotel.
VE (b. 1923, Salonica) came to Turkey when she was 1.5 year old, 
and grew up with her family’s happy memories and good relations 
with their Greek friends and neighbors in Salonica. She mentioned her 
feelings about the Greeks:
Because of all those happy memories of my family I loved Greeks a lot, and 
because of this Greek love, I wanted to become a teacher in a Greek school 
in Istanbul when I graduated from teachers college. I applied to the Zapeion 
School [Greek School] in Istanbul, and I worked there with happiness and 
joy.27
Unlike VE and ET, other interviewees talked about the deteriorated 
relations between Greeks and Turks after the war. They were not as 
close as they were with their Muslim friends, but had a distant but 
respectful relationship. AE (b. 1928, Söke), a second generation Cretan 
whose family landed in Izmir before the compulsory exchange, stated:
I do not believe today’s nostalgic stories about the Greek-Turkish relations. 
What I heard from my family does not match what I am hearing nowadays. 
Even though my father had a cigarette factory with a Greek partner and had 
extended business relations with the Greek community, people of both com­
munities had distant social relations, they did not have any social relations 
outside business, they did not live intimately, but side by side.28
When Muslim Turks started to experience discrimination and became 
‘others’ in their homelands as a result of increased Greek nationalism, they 
willingly moved to Turkey (except for ET’s family) either before the ex­
change or under the regulations of the compulsory population exchange. 
They displayed the typical responses of being the ‘other’ in their former 
homelands under the Greek rule (except ET and VE). They called Greeks 
‘others’ or ‘the Greek’ (Rum) with an unpleasant tone. Conversely, they 
admired the Greek culture and regarded it as their source of civilization. 
Particularly, female interviewees underlined this point:
27. VE, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 9 May 2003.
28. AE, Oral History Interview, 20 July 2003.
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We really lived in civilization in Ioannina. When we came to Turkey the 
state offered us and some other Ioanninans land and houses in agricultural 
regions. We did not want this offer, nobody wanted it, because we came 
from civilization, we didn’t know how to deal with agriculture. The Greeks 
were really very civilized people. We had their manners, it is normal, isn’t 
it? People learn what they see in their childhood. Everybody liked us when 
we came to Istanbul, the newspapers wrote that Pendik turned into Paris, 
we were talking in Greek, our traditions were different. We didn’t look like 
the other newcomers, we were different.29
However, their admiration of the Greek culture and people did not 
prevent them from seeing their Greek fellows as ‘others’ (except for two 
female interviewees). None of them recall any mixed marriages between 
Greeks and Muslims in their immediate environment. They said that this 
was something impossible, that everybody preferred internal marriages 
within the community.30 ‘Mixing’ with the Greeks was not something
29. RO, Oral History Interview, 7 May 2003. Similarly, VE and KHT described 
Greeks as civilized people, and their habits and attitudes were like theirs since they 
co-existed with them. Their parents had their civilized culture, and so did they. 
According to them, being a rumelili (to come from Rumeli) is a really different thing.
30. Three of the interviewees, KHT, VE, and AE, had a Greek grandmother 
and grandfather. When KHT learned that her grandmother was Greek, she was 
surprised and felt proud of it, although her father was very uncomfortable when 
she asked questions about her. He would say, ‘but all Greek women who married 
to Turkish soldiers in Ioannina loved their husbands a lot, they became Muslims 
willingly’. KHT disagrees with her father: ‘why you are hiding it, it is a good thing, 
and to convert them to be Muslim is not nice, imagine if it happened to us, it is 
not nice’. AE’s maternal grandmother was a Greek from Asia Minor; however, he 
himself does not favour Turkish-Greek marriages. The dialogue between us:
FT: Your grandmother was Greek, how do you approach marriages between the 
two communities?
AE: I do not favour it, but one of my daughters married an English man, I did not 
approve, but she was above 18, what could I do.
FT: What I meant was how do you approach Greek-Turkish marriages? If one of 
your daughters wanted to marry a Greek?
AE: No, I don’t want it.
FT: But your grandmother was Greek?
AE: I don’t care, I don’t want it, and I would feel sorry. But, as I told you my 
daughter is now married to an English man, I tolerate it, although I do not 
approve of it.
VE’s paternal grandfather was Greek and she is very proud of it. She calls her
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favorable for our families, they mentioned. They also expressed the 
sentiment that they were aware of the reality of Greek hatred toward 
Turks, which revealed itself openly during the advance of the Greek 
military campaign in Western Asia Minor.
As for the compulsory population exchange, they expressed their 
gratitude to the decision makers in Lausanne. According to them, the 
exchange was the success of Mustafa Kemal and his group and their 
memoirs were full of ideals of nascent Turkish nationalism. They were 
grateful to statesmen since they took them to the ‘Turkish land’. RO 
stressed many times how appropriate the decision of the complusory 
population exchange was:
God bless him [Mustafa Kemal] that he took us to Turkish land. He did a 
very good thing, very good. We suffered a lot, but never mind, we were 
very happy that we landed into the Turkish land. When we arrived, we 
always celebrated the foundation of the Republic’s day joyfully; I always 
carried the flags at school in Istanbul. What were we going to do among 
them [Rums], even if it was a wonderful homeland, what does it mean to be 
with them? Could there be a better thing than to step into the Turkish land?31
LK who left Ioannina at the age of 9 notes:
We really suffered an ordeal here (in Turkey), a great suffering. We lost all of 
our property when we came here. My father was a civil servant in Ioannina, 
bank manager at the Agricultural Bank, but at the same time, we owned a 
village there, therefore we had an enormous amount of wealth in Ioannina. 
But, if we had stayed there, what was going to happen to us? Was there any 
chance of survival for us there? Or were we going to be assimilated? When 
we think about these things, we are thankful for our condition now. We just 
saved our lives, this is what happened, we hardly stayed on our feet here
mother a ‘Westerner’ and she states that ‘my mother raised us with Western 
traditions, I started going to theatres when I was in secondary school, we learned 
to read books, all these things are western traditions’.
31. RO herself has a bad memory of the Greek kids in Ioannina: when she was 
12, she was beaten by Greek boys because she was a Turk. She was very scared and 
had such a shock that she contracted malaria after this event. It took her two years 
to overcome it. She says: ‘in fact such things were not happening but that day by 
chance male kids of the other neighbourhood came to our neighbourhood I guess. In 
our neighbourhood such things did not happen before’. RO, Oral History Interview, 
7 May 2003.
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with an immense struggle, as the state was newly founded, and it had noth­
ing with which to support us.32
MF (b. 1919, Chrisoupoli (Sariçaban), Kavala),33 in spite of being a 
strong admirer of Mustafa Kemal, showed some hesitation about the ap­
propriateness of the compulsory population exchange.
We really suffered here, we lived in immense poverty, I could not attend 
school after secondary school, I worked in every kind of job, but when I think 
about it now, if we had stayed there, would it have been better? I don’t think 
so. I am happy that we came. But, sometimes I think and I realize that ideas 
change, for example if I was asked this question twenty years ago, I would 
say no, it is not a good thing that we came here, but now, 1 am more comfort­
able. I bought this house, my children are university graduates, and therefore 
recently I have started seeing it as a good decision. But, the exchange was a re­
ally good thing for those who took advantage of the unorganized re-settlement 
procedures; those who were smart and canny made big profits when they 
came, they occupied all the big houses, empty lands in Darica. I was little, and 
me and my mother alone, we could not do anything, we did whatever people 
told us; people told us you are only two, so we took an abandoned very old 
house with four walls only, nothing more.34
In general, interviewees themselves talked about how they see the 
compulsory exchange without being asked. When they were asked openly 
whether it was a good decision or not, they directly referred to the Turk­
ish representatives headed by îsmet inönü at the Lausanne Conference. 
They said the decision was fine so that they could come here. RO states: 
If Mustafa Kemal decided so it was necessary.35 
LK notes:
I am still voting for the Republican People’s Party, although it is the worst, I 
cannot act ungratefully, if we are here now, we owe this to them.36
32. LK, Oral History Interview, 10 May 2003.
33. Chrisoupoli (Sariçaban) district was a district in Kavala where Turkish was 
spoken. MF noted that they had no Greek neighbours or friends there, and they 
did not know a word of Greek. As he describes, it was a district populated totally 
by Turks.
34. MF, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 13 May 2003.
35. RO, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 7 May 2003.
36. LK, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 10 May 2003.
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ET says:
The compulsory exchange decision was taken according to the desire of 
Atatürk. This means it was an appropriate decision. I adore Atatürk, I believe 
that he was a superhuman being, therefore I think his decisions and doings 
were not wrong.37
AE states:
Of course the exchange was a good thing, but in its application big prob­
lems occurred. It was a good decision; to live there was already not possible 
anymore. Is the life of people in Western Thrace a life today? At the same time, 
however, the exchange was a disastrous event in that it destroyed all Ottoman 
culture in those lands.38
Hence we see how they appropriated the Republican People’s Par­
ty’s (RPP) policy ‘for the people’ (the state is working for the people 
and knows better what is good for them), never ‘by the people’.39 Al­
though they were critical of the resettlement policies of the Turkish State 
(this means the RPP, whose government ruled Turkey between 1926 and 
1946, the period known as ‘the single-party period’), they automatically 
accepted the compulsory population exchange as an appropriate deci­
sion since Mustafa Kemal and his group decided for it. They never ques­
tioned the ‘compulsory’ nature of the exchange during their narration.
While they were talking about their approach to the compulsory 
population exchange, they themselves, without being asked, brought 
up present-day Turkey comparing it to the Turkey of Atatürk, in which 
they had grown up. This led some of them to deal with the rise of Islamic 
parties in Turkey and ruling of the Justice and Progress Party, whose 
leader and cadre is made up of former Islamist Welfare Party members.
37. ET, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 16 July 2003.
38. AE, Oral History Interview, Izmir, 20 July 2003. AE states that the Greek Go­
vernment purposefully kept the Turkish community of Western Thrace ignorant: ‘It 
appointed them an ignorant imam who was not acceptable as a representative of Islam. 
He was the biggest religious ignorant fanatic. People had no right to choose their own 
imams there, the state decided for them. Here is what the state decided for them, to 
keep them in that ignorance’.
39. Çükrü Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 207.
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In this context we see how they perceived the Turkish Republic, what
it meant for them:
In those years Turkey was not like today’s Turkey. Now, Turkey is in such a 
condition that it is difficult to recognize. If this government does not change 
its mind about implementing its hidden projects, the military will stop them. 
This government is already under the strict monitoring of the military. When 
the followers of this government earlier openly acted against the principle of 
secularism, they were fired from their positions. But when this government 
came to power, it gave them their positions back. Atatürk entrusted this 
country to the youth, but the youth does not show any sensibility; therefore 
the military says that if you don’t take care of this trust, I will do it. And it 
says I will not let the reactionaries or racist nationalists [he means the fol­
lowers of the Grey Wolf Movement in Turkey] but I’ll rule it. And I support 
them. I know that it would be very bad, if the rule of the country again goes 
to the hands of the military. But, it would be the best of the worst.40
MF talked about the same issue in the context of the veil:
My mother used to wear a veil, but it was a normal head scarf. It wasn’t like 
today’s particular types of veils. Each particular type of covering expresses 
certain relations and meanings nowadays, in our times there was no such a 
thing. I am a strong adherent of Atatürk. I always vote for the Republican 
People’s Party, my mind does not understand others. I am his follower but 
not blindly. I am his follower because all of his actions and policies led to 
well-made and secure results, there was nothing wrong with them.41
AE is also strongly against rising Islamic trends in Turkey:
My grandfather had organized a band of outlaws with his friends when 
he came here. He and his friends were bandits attacking Greek farms and 
Greek bandits who would come from Samos (Sisam) island. They had a very 
hard time in Kuçadasi and Söke. In short, they had done what they had 
learned from them in Crete. They applied the same things. My grand father’s 
wife was a Greek, who converted to Islam, but he remained very hostile to 
Greeks. Later on, he and his two friends with whom he formed the band 
joined the Turkish Independence War. He was awarded for his service in the 
Independence War. My father was a nationalist, not a racist. For example, 
except my name, all my siblings’ names are Turkish names.42 My father had 
a spirit of ‘national forces’ (kuva-yi milliye). I myself have no political idea 
in this Turkey. I do not approve of the politics of this Islamic government
40. ET, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 16 July 2003.
41. MF, Oral History Interview, Istanbul, 13 May 2003.
42. AE’s family was a Bektashi family.
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and these developments like the foundation of Imam Hatip schools.43 If these 
schools are going to train prayer leaders, they should not open more than 
enough. Moreover, why are they attending universities after Imam Hatip 
school, if they are decided to become preachers why do they want to become 
lawyers, bureaucrats or engineers? They get brainwashed in these schools, 
then, when they are placed in the high bureaucracy they act against the 
state policy and the principles of revolution. I do not vote the Republican 
People’s Party either. Today everything is degenerated. Today, there is no 
real Bektashi. Atatürk did a good thing by abolishing sects and denomina­
tions. Otherwise, they were going to be degenerated as well.44
The muhacirs appear to be well adapted to the Turkish State’s princi­
ple of radical secularism. Following the establishment of the Turkish Re­
public in 1923, the political elite, apart from being determined to conduct 
Western reforms, also attempted to secularize political life and society. 
The principle of democracy remained secondary to state secularism in 
Turkey during the nation building process. The six founding principles 
of the Turkish Republic excluded democracy, since the ruling elite was 
always suspicious that the sovereignty of the people would end up in 
the sovereignty of Islam.45 Like Southeastern European nationalisms, 
Turkish nationalism of the political elite having opted for ethnic prem­
ises created a concept of ‘turkishness’ to impose the idea of homogene­
ity on people remaining in the country. This imposition could be done 
through forming a national history. History is used effectively by the 
Turkish State to impose the national project, as in the case of many other 
nationalisms. For this aim, the Turkish History Thesis was formed in the 
First Turkish History Congress in July 1932. This new composition of 
national history had some problems: it required detaching the history
43. Imam Hatip schools are schools at high school level, which train mosque 
prayer leaders and preachers.
44. AE, Oral History Interview, 20 July 2003. Other interviewees also expressed 
a similar attitude against rising Islamic trends in Turkey. They are against them 
since they see them against the principles of Atatürk. Female interviewees expressed 
similar ideas in the context of the veil. They themselves do not use veil, but their 
parents did, except for the mothers of ET and KHT.
45. Göle Nilüfer, ‘Authoritarian secularism and Islamist politics: The case of 
Turkey’, in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. II, 
New York / Köln / Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996, p. 19-20.
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of the Turks from the history of Islam and justifying the reasons for the 
Turks to have their own nation state in Asia Minor.46
During the First Turkish History Congress, the principles were de­
termined about how the new nation should perceive itself and present 
its history to future generations in the rewriting of the textbooks. This 
was achieved without mentioning the ethnic diversity of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the disappearance of the Christian elements of the Empire.47 
The main goal of the Turkish national project was ‘to reach the level of 
civilized nations’, which meant Western civilization.48 Moreover, in the 
nation building process, the political leadership attempted to break all 
cultural ties with the Ottoman past. Furthermore, the state exercised 
huge pressure and discipline from top to down not only to improve the 
economy,49 but also to discipline its citizens with the idea that everyone 
works for the state and the state works for everyone.50 The Turkish po­
litical interest of the 1930s was very hostile to diversity, liberalism, plu­
ralism and individual interest. What it admired in the Soviet Union was 
not Marxism as a theory and ideology of the oppressed, but the strength 
of the state, its ability to impose its will on society, to exercise iron dis­
cipline in the cause of modernization.51 Eventually, the Turkish version 
of the nation building process with its secular and disciplinary project52
46. Halil Berktay, ‘Dort Tarihçinin Sosyal Portresi’ [‘The social portrait of four 
historians’], Toplum ve Bilim 54-55 (1991), p. 28-31.
47. Re§at Kasaba, ‘Kemalist certainties and modern ambiguities’, in Re§at Kasaba 
and Sibel Bozdogan (eds), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997; Soner Çagaptay, Islam, Secularism, 
and Nationalism in Modern Turkey, London and New York: Routledge 2006.
48. Reçat Kasaba, op. cit., p. 26-28.
49. Halil Berktay, ‘The peasant in Western and Turkish History’, in Suraiya 
Faroqhi and Halil Berktay (eds), New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman 
History, London: Frank Cass, 1992, p. 109-185.
50. Ibid., p. 153.
51. Ibid., p. 146.
52. RO, who left Ioannina at the age of 13, and her two years older sister had to 
attend primary school, although they were teenagers, in order to learn Turkish. She 
narrated how they learned Turkish: ‘we were sitting in a corner of the classroom, 
they called as muhacir girls, we didn’t know any Turkish. Then, when they realized 
that we cannot learn Turkish since our parents and aunts talked to us in Greek at 
home, they enforced a fine if we spoke in Greek. The principal sent an employee to
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under statism became quite successful.53 In this research, muhacirs who 
grew up under the influence of the Turkish nationalist project also show 
how influential this project has been.
Muhacirs do not want Westernization or Western culture to be 
challenged, because they appropriated it as the only real civilization. 
According to them, the Turkish Republic has definite principles and 
rising Islamic tendencies are against these principles. They expressed 
their disapproval and dislike of the political Islam by referring to 
Atatürk, not to their personal secular nature or their dislike of totalitarian 
religious systems. They equated the rise of Islamic tendencies to the 
danger of being ruled by an Islamic order, to which they are strongly 
opposed. The interviewees in this research reflected the general idea of 
most of the secular people in Turkey. The general idea of many secular 
Turkish people is that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan uses dissimulation 
(takiyye): he hides his true intentions until it is the right time to reveal 
them.54 For the informant muhacirs, too, today’s ruling Islamic party has 
hidden intentions of restoring Islamic order in Turkey.
In muhacirs’ memoirs, there is no difference between the popular 
and the national memory, because what is popular was also national 
in the society of the emerging Turkish Republic. They perceive the 
Turkish State in accordance with the Kemalist ideology, regardless of 
their desperate economic conditions and the social turmoil in the new 
Turkish society. According to the muhacirs, they saved their lives when 
finally the Turkish nation was truly founded as a result of the Turkish 
War of Independence, and they were integrated into the ‘nation’ by the 
compulsory population exchange. They landed in the ‘homeland’ where 
they ethnically and religiously belong.
As for the idea of the ‘homeland’, in the Turkish literature on the ex­
change of populations, the notion of ‘motherland’ does not exist, unlike
our houses to tell our families about it, and also told the elder sister that they should 
also learn Turkish. We graduated from primary school when we were 17’. RO, Oral 
History Interview, 7 May 2003.
53. For the discussion on statism, state nationalism, see Berktay, op. cit.
54. Metin Heper and §ule Toktaç, ‘Islam, modernity, and democracy in contempo­
rary Turkey: the case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’, The Muslim World 93 (April 2003),
p. 160.
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in the Greek literature on Greeks from Asia Minor. In the Turkish case, 
the predominant idea is that of belonging to a powerful sovereign state.55 
Similarly, in my research, the muhacirs, unlike Greeks from Asia Minor, 
did not call the places they left ‘homeland’.56 For the Muslim Turkish 
muhacirs, the important thing was to live under the sovereign Turkish 
rule with their co-religionists. However, we should not forget that the 
record of popular sentiments of the parents of these muhacirs, who were 
the adult first generation muhacirs, is missing in Turkish historiography. 
The homeland of their children, muhacir interviewees in this paper, be­
came the Turkish Republic in which they grew up. Regrettably, we will 
never know what their parents, the adult muhacirs, would call their 
‘homeland’. All interviewees said that their parents could not live long, 
that they died in misery and silence in Turkey, particularly their fathers.
Forced population transfers, as one of the tools of modernity, were 
used in order to ‘cultivate ethnic consciousness’ with the aim of creating 
ethnically homogenous nation states. They became an expedient method 
of the demographic struggle for power for the sake of ethnic consolida­
tion or dispersal.57 Several population exchanges that were conducted af­
55. Hercules Millas, ‘The Exchange of Populations in Turkish literature: The 
undertone of texts’, in Hirschon, op. cit., p. 221.
56. For testimonies of Greeks from Asia Minor see the publications and the Oral 
Tradition Archive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies.
57. Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power: the Political 
Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World, London/Portland, Or. : 
Frank Cass, 1997. For the historical roots of the population exchanges see Joseph 
Scheda, ‘The ideological roots of the population transfer’, Third World Quarterly 14/2 
(1993), p. 239-275. The idea of the population exchange was not new either for the 
nascent nation states in the Balkans or for Turkey. For example, an exchange protocol 
was added to the treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913), which ended the second 
Balkan war, between Bulgaria and the Ottoman state. In this agreement it was stated 
that ‘optional reciprocal exchange of the Bulgarian and Muslim populations within 
fifteen kilometers of the entire common frontier should be facilitated’. However, 
since a large number of people had already migrated during the Balkan wars, this 
agreement covered only a small number of the remaining inhabitants. See Ladas, op. 
cit., p. 18-19. Moreover, the Young Turks, who succeeded in establishing the exchange 
agreement with Bulgaria about the minority ‘problem’, aimed to achieve the same 
thing with Greece. On the 19th of May 1914 the clauses of the agreement between 
the Ottoman State and Greece were completed by the commission. However, the
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ter the First World War were modeled on the Turkish-Greek compulso­
ry population exchange of 1923.58 Critical approaches in political science, 
sociology, anthropology, and history are questioning international laws 
and the ‘necessity’ of the forced population transfers, stressing their hu­
man dimension, and evaluating them as one of the failures of modernity. 
However, from the perspective of the people who experienced it, like 
the Turkish muhacirs, the forced population transfer is something they 
liked and approved of, since it took them to their ‘nation’ or ‘imagined 
nation’. In other words, they mythologized the Turkish State’s ideology 
and policies so that they reconstructed it and gave meaning to this trau­
matic event in their lives.
In the final analysis, the narration of the muhacirs in this paper 
indicated the success of the Turkish national project, which imposed 
former non-Muslim entities of Turkey as suspicious ‘others’ over the 
homogeneous society they wanted to form. A generation grew up ab­
sorbing the nationalist discourse, which led to separation of peoples 
and alienation. This eliminated the possibility of mutual respect and 
understanding, and led to ‘fear, suspicion, hostility and inability to
outbreak of the First World War suspended the activity of the commission, and 
this exchange agreement could not be effectuated. See Yannis Mourelos, ‘The 1914 
persecutions and the first attempt at an exchange of minorities between Greece 
and Turkey’, Balkan Studies 26/2 (1985), p. 389-413. Furthermore, the Greek and 
Bulgarian governments signed a Convention Respecting the Reciprocal Emigration 
of Their Racial Minorities on the 27th of November 1919, on the same day the Neuilly 
Treaty was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine; Ladas, op. cit., p. 27.
58. For example, between Germany and the Soviet Union; many Germans 
living in the territories occupied by the Soviet, such as Estonia, Latvia, Bessarabia, 
Lithuania, etc., were transferred to Germany. Also, the same applies to the population 
exchange agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1944, and the exchange 
of populations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1946. Robert Μ. Hayden, 
‘Schindler’s fate: genocide, ethnic cleansing and population transfers’, Slavic 
Review 55/4 (Winter 1996), p. 727-748. The Greek-Turkish case also constituted an 
example for the decision makers as a ‘workable solution’ to the India-Pakistan case. 
The exchange of populations between India and Pakistan in 1947 was the largest 
exchange of populations ever, involving more than 11 million Hindus and Muslims. 
Furthermore, the pattern of the Turkish-Greek population exchange was quoted in 
1937 by the British Royal Commission on Palestine (Peel Commission) as a model 
that would solve the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. Scheda, op. cit., p. 239-275.
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cooperate’.59 Furthermore, nationalist histories created and promoted 
the concept of ‘other’ that made conciliation and mutual understand­
ing impossible. Nationalism attempts to obtain support from history to 
solidify its ideology. Therefore, history, with or without purpose, con­
tributes to developing a sense of superiority for the group it favors.60 In 
this creation of ‘other’ a group prejudgment is produced with a nega­
tive tone. Official histories contributed to the alienation among citizens 
by attributing a sense of superiority to the dominant ethnic majority. 
Getting rid of the sense of superiority is crucial to abolish the prejudg­
ment on ‘others’.61 The source of the conflicts is not differences, but the 
superiority claims of the dominant ethnic majority or rule. If we could 
free superiority arguments from the ‘other’ discourse and render it to 
differences, it would be possible to understand the vitality and dynam­
ics of multi ethnic and multi religious societies, which in turn would not 
only lead to peaceful coexistence, but also interaction.62
Turkish official history puts into the category of the ‘other’ not only 
Greeks, but also Muslim Turks who practice Islam as a religion and iden­
tify themselves with their religion. When a common ‘other’ is officially 
created, then that group builds up a sense of hatred against this exclu- 
sivist attitude. This creates tension and mutual fear in society. Hence, 
one of the tasks of the professional historians should be to question these 
superiority arguments and demystify their bases.63 Otherwise, national 
histories fed by the sense of ‘other’ will continue to contribute to more 
conflict and violence. The articulation of Turkish nationalism leads to se­
rious consequences. In this context, it might be worthwhile to remember 
how ordinary people joined the government instigated attacks against 
Greek and other non-Muslim businesses and shops in Istanbul in 1955, 
known as the 6-7 September events.64 History constitutes the base for
59. Hirschon, op. cit., p. 10.
60. ilhan Tekeli, ‘Tarih Yaziciligi ve Oteki Kavrami Uzerine Düçünceler’, in 
Ali Berktay and Hamdi Can Tuncer (eds), Tarih Egitimi ve Tarihte Oteki’ Sorunu, 
Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1998, p. 1.
61. Ibid., p. 2.
62. For the discussion of ‘other’ for both countries, see Berktay and Tuncer, op. cit.
63. Tekeli, op. cit., p. 5.
64. For the 6-7 September events and the deportation of Greeks of Istanbul
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politics. Therefore the character of history is crucial in a country. Histor­
ical writing itself could become understanding and changing of political 
discourses and ideologies. As a muhacir from Salonica states:
A garden is beautiful with all its fruits and flowers. Is there any garden with 
only one flower?65
NOTES ON THE INTERVIEWEES
RO has graduated from secondary school. She lives in Istanbul.
LT has graduated from secondary school and worked in various jobs in Istanbul. 
Finally, he worked in the State Railways Institution (Devlet Demir Yollan) 
for 16 years, from where he retired. He lives in Istanbul.
ET is a university graduate. He did an MBA in the USA. He worked as a high level 
bureaucrat in Ankara in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He lives in Izmir.
KHT graduated from high school in Izmir. She is a housewife. She is the spouse 
of ET. Their families have known each other from Ioannina. She lives in Izmir.
VE has graduated from Teachers’ College (Ögretmen Okulu). She worked as a 
teacher in a Greek School (Zapyon Lisesi) in Istanbul. She lives in Istanbul.
AE has graduated from the Boarding Technical High School (Parasiz Meslek 
Yatili Lisesi). He worked in the Turkish Military with a contract as a 
technician; he joined the Korean War, and decided to continue his father’s 
profession of money-changing and jewellery. He lives in Izmir.
MF had to leave secondary school due to economic difficulties. He worked in 
various jobs. Finally he worked in a tobacco factory and became a tobacco 
expert; he retired from there. He lives in Istanbul.
in the following years see Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azinhk Politikalan 
Baglaminda 6-7 Eyliil olaylan, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 2005; Alexis Alexandris, The 
Greek Minority of Istanbul, Turkish-Greek Relations, 1922-1974, Athens: Centre for 
Asia Minor Studies, 1984.
65. Quoted from Iskender Özsoy, Iki Vatan Yorgunlan I, Istanbul: Baslan 
Yayinlari, 2003.
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